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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE:
PLAINTIFF HAS N O T RAISED NEW ISSUES O N APPEAL.

Plaintiff agrees that it is not appropriate to raise issues for the first time
on appeal; however, Plaintiff has always disputed City Market's assertion that its lease
did not give said defendant any right to use or possess any portion of the common
areas which include the parking lots and fire lane surrounding the City Market store in
Price, Utah. Contrary to City Market's assertion that Plaintiff never challenged the
contents of the Defendant's lease agreement prior to this appeal, Plaintiff responds
that it has challenged the unsupported statements concerning the contents of the
leases since they were first raised by City Market in the case at bar.
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that, upon information and belief, City Market is a
tenant of defendant Utah State Retirement Office and as such has a proprietary
interest of some sort in the parking lot and fire lane area surrounding its business (See
Addenda D to Brief of Appellant, Plaintiffs Complaint, ^f's 2, 3 & 12 ). Additionally,
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to City Market's Motion for Summary

1

Judgment provides in Plaintiffs Statement of Facts at paragraph 1 that City Market "is
the lessee of both the building and the parking lot area."
City Market's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed with the court during
ongoing discovery and was unsupported by any affidavits establishing the terms of its
lease or by production of its lease agreements. Plaintiff challenged City Market's
assertion about the contents of its lease by raising the fact that City Market had
represented itself to Price City as being a tenant of the owner/landlord of this
commercial subdivision and claimed the right to use designated parking stalls and the
fire lane surrounding its store. Plaintiff submitted the Affidavit of Molly Penovich of
the Price City Planning and Zoning Department which affidavit was attached as
Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Memorandum. The whole purpose of that affidavit was to
dispute City Market's unsupported claim that it had no proprietary or possessory
interests in the parking lot or common areas surrounding its store. The Penovich
affidavit included the express site plan provided by City Market to Price City wherein
City Market designated itself as the tenant of the building "and the surrounding
parking area." ( See, Statement of Facts, ^f 2, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition
to City Market's Motion for Summary Judgment).
The affidavit created a disputed fact, namely, should the court accept the
unsupported assertion made by City Market about the contents of its lease or should
the court look to City Market's 20+ year history of claiming to be a tenant with rights

2

and maintain its business license.
City Market now contends that the terms of its lease were not challenged by
Plaintiff during oral argument and are raised for the first time on appeal. Plaintiff
repeatedly

*•

;

inng oral argun : .e • i it t! lat 1:1 1 is case w as stil 1 i i i tl ic discov eiy

process (Transcript of Oral Argument, lines 4-6 p. 17) and that City Market had held
itself out as the tenant with a right to possess a n d / o r use the parking lot and fire lane
areas around its store to Price City for over twenty years. (See, discussion between
Plan itiff s cc ;i u lsel ai id tl le c :>i n I: c o i iceri in lg the site plan at t icl led to tl ic I ei 10 \ icl i
affidavit located in the Transcript of Oral Argument at p. 2 1 , line 11 through p. 23,
line 21).
After the court looked at the site plan attached to the Penovich affidavit, the
(

.-1yi

.

oreseeabil.it fy ai id Plaii itiff responded by

arguing that even if, we accepted that Defendant City Market .1 lad no i esponsibilit y
under the terms of the written lease, Defendant City Market would still have a duty to
the plaintiff as its business invitee. (See, Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 12, line 22
througl : j: • 1! 3 Hi le 10) 1 }h tit it iff :li :11 ic t coi icede t I lat 1:1 ic • t ::i i i is of t 1 ic lease were as
represented by City Market but rather, in arguendo, that if the lease furnol < ml l<» 1
as represented, then City Market still had a separate and distinct duty to the Plaintiff.
(Transcript of Oral Argument, p.321, lines 5-8).
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Plaintiff has always maintained that City Market is a tenant and has a right of
possession and/or use in the subject common areas as evidenced by the application
and site plan it has continuously produced to Price City , but Plaintiff also contends
that City Market's duty to its business invitees goes far beyond its leasehold interests
and arises from the concept of "Duty" that has been developed by the courts of the
State of Utah over the past fifty years and as was outlined by Plaintiff during oral
argument with reference to Carlile v. Wal-Mart, 61 P.3d 287, 2002 UT App 412
(Utah App. 12/12/2002) and other supporting authority. Plaintiff respectfully
contends that the terms of the lease, if any, are disputed issues of fact and should have
been submitted to a jury after the completion of discovery and the final amendment
of the pleadings as urged by Plaintiff through the entire oral argument.

POINT TWO
A BUSINESS OWNER OWES HIS BUSINESS INVITEES A DUTY
WHETHER T H E BUSINESS OWNER HAS A N OWNERSHIP/
POSSESSORY INTEREST IN T H E PREMISES WHERE T H E INJURY
OCCURRED OR N O T , IF T H E OWNER KNOWS, OR SHOULD KNOW,
THAT INJURY IS REASONABLY FORESEEABLE.
In Point One of the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff outlined the current status of
premises liability law in Utah. Plaintiffs theories of recovery are embraced within the
case law that has developed under the first prong of the test outlined in Carlile,
namely, that the business owner knew or should have known of the hazardous
condition and failed to warn or protect his business invitee even though injury was
4

reason

« foreseeable.

Market ilow responses that it can not find a case where

the business owner has been held liable for inji

PI nt

the business owner's actual business site. That position does not respond to the
analysis outlined in Carlile or the arguments and theories of recovery contained in the
Brief c Appellai

istead of evaluating the development of the duty/risk analysis

contained in CariiJe and tl ie cases cited tl :iei eii 1 ( -ity Mai "ket si.1 nplj takes til :itc • j » : s it IN :>i i
that Carlile would have come down differently if the injury had occurred off Walmart's premises. Such is not the express language in Cadile and the cases cited therein,
including Dwiggins v. Morgan jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, (Utah 1991) and Pagen v.
Thrift City, 23 Utah °<1 ?(I7, Aui) 1V\I SIC (19*

v

:•*- ^ , , ; u u extensively ii i

Brief of Appellant, provide that business owners have a duty to business invitees to
discover and warn them of the possible hazards created by third parties if it is
reasonably foreseeable that injury will result from the hazard. Carlile expressly holds
that "bi jsii less owi lers have a di it \ tc p • re > • si it accidei ita 1, negligei

intentional -

harmful acts of third persons, if they know or should have known, that injury could
occur."
Nothing in any of the cases cited by either side expressly requires that the
injury be '">ii llir biMtiejs «»\uin\ premises The ililli inn i tu the jiulysis nl these
cases by the parties demonstrates the difference in the social theory ;\< \\ ^ \XThili
City Market would retreat into its "own four walls" and allow its customers to be
injured by hazards on its own door step, the modern view of duty is that a business
5

own has some affirmative duty to his customers when he invites them to do business
at his store. It is the knowledge, either real or constructive, and foreseeability of the
injury known to the business owner that imposes the duty to take action to warn his
business invitees of the danger. That is even more true when the business owner has
a hazard immediately adjacent to his main entrance and then continues to invite the
customer to cross the hazard to conduct business. In that scenario, it is even arguable
that the business owner created the risk of injury because the hazard itself was not the
cause of the accident. The cause of the injury was the invitation to conduct business
when it was reasonably foreseeable that those w h o accepted the offer would be
subjected to risk of injury.
City Market does not deny that the hole that caused Plaintiffs injuries was
within a few feet of its only store entrance and within the natural flow of traffic from
its designated parking area to its entrance. City Market does not deny that it was
reasonably foreseeable that persons could be injured. In fact, the risk was significant
enough that its own store manager, Sonny, told the Plaintiff that others had been
injured and he actually placed a warning sign in the hole after Plaintiffs injury.%
City Market continues to argue that it does not have a possessory interest in the
property. Plaintiff continues to argue, as has been argued from the very beginning,
that what City Market says to the world and what it is saying to the Court in this case
are not consistent. Since City Market did not produce its leases or any affidavits
establishing the contents of same, Plaintiff responded by showing that City Market
6

1 ; id he Id it self : " 1 • 1 c be • a tt t i; u n w id I ;; pc -cific possessory rights of use by its business
invitees in the parking lot and fire lane area pursuant to the sil e pis u I pi epared by ( }il y
Market itself. T h a t site plan was left in continuous possession with Price City to
support City Market's business license for twenty years. City Market contends that the
affidavit of the Planning and Z o n i n g employee does n o t state that City Market has an
ownership interest in the commoi i areas. This is correct

It a lso does i lot sa\ tl lat

City Market does n o t have a possessory o r use interest in t h e c o m m o n areas. It does
demonstrate the City Market has enough dominion and control over the c o m m o n
areas arc i

re to guarantee the minimum requirements for parking and safety.

Plaintiff contends that si ici i dominioi I ai id control is si lfficiei it for a ji n \ t : • ft i id tl iat
City Market h a d at least enough control to take action t o protect its business invitees.
Conflicting statements like the representations made by City Market in the site plan,
which was prepared by City Market itself, gives rise t o a disputed fact: Is City Market
is in actual possession o- the area where Plainlil I" - > i"« m | u n \ P
While City Market argues that it is n o t a "possessor of land", such a definition
is extremely self-serving w h e n you d o n o t tender the leases by which you claim
insuLili- 'ii (t« »»n responsibihlv

hi hit t, Plaintiff argued in Brief of Appellant that such

an approach would encourage In nil'»nl« ,uul <» n ii»t« '»• u n»",it tivin ill* «< h h,

\ ,1

responsibilities to their business invitees. T h e principles expressed in Carlile si pv> n i
sound public policy, namely, that if you are a business and you invite persons to d o
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business at your establishment and you know or should have known of a hazard, then
you should be held responsible, if you did not attempt to prevent it
By contrast, City Market defines only a "public invitee" and argues that a
plaintiff is only given protection as an invitee while she is on the land of the business
owner. Such a position ignores all the facts that create the duty on City Market Our
Plaintiff had responded to the invitation and conducted business with City Market
She was exiting the business at night when she fell into a hole in the asphalt at the
immediate sole entrance/exit to that business establishment Plaintiff, a business
invitee, had no alternative to get from the store to the only parking area within a
reasonable walking distance except to cross the area where the hole is located. The
duty to such a business invitee is not limited by the boundaries of the businessman's
property but rather "by the duty that arises when the business owner knows or should
know" that injury is likely to occur. Carlile, % 12.
City Market then argues that unless liability is limited to the property
boundaries of a business owner, presumably as defined by deed or lease, all business
owners will be subject to liability for injuries that may happen at great distances from
the actual store location. That position ignores the requirements that the business
owner must know, or be deemed to have known, that the hazard exists and that it
could injure people.
The case at bar creates two opposing positions: Plaintiffs position is that a
business owner who invites people to do business is responsible for the reasonably
8

foreseeable hazards direc I:H associated \\ itl i acceptii ighis invitation.,, if 1 le knew or
should have known, that those hazards existed and were likely to c < <

»y

Market takes the position that it is responsible only for what goes on within the four
walls of its leased premises. Even a surface comparison of those two positions and
the affect each woui

iie safety of the consumer/business invitee speaks for

itself Carlile and its predecessors stand for the proposition th;n \\ v linvr :i sonni
conscious and do not allow businesses to benefit from creating or ignoring risks to
their customers.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that City Market had actually knowledge, in addition
to constructive knowledge, of the hazard ,mtl did nothing to w .nil llir Pl.iiiihl'l
Plaintiff pointed to numerous disputed facts and many reasonable inferences which
could allow a jury to find in Plaintiffs favor on those issues had Plaintiff been allowed
to proceed. Summary Judgment was not appropriate given the numerous disputed
issues of fact in this matter.

CONCLUSION
Since the Plaintiff has not raised new issues on Appeal and since the trial court
misconstrued current Utah premises liability law and came to conclusions
incotisi'iicni wild i lie Carlile case. Plaintiff prays that this Court reverse the trial
court's grant of summary judgment and i ei 1 lai id 1 1 lis • :ase back tc 1 1 i< * t ri a I •• : : n in it: f c r
the completion of discovery and the scheduling of trial expeditiously as possible, as

9

this is an interlocutory appeal and the other Defendant who has not been involved in
this matter has been delayed during the pendency of this appeal.

Respectfully submitted this 24th day of January, 2005.

Joane Pappas White
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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this is an interlocutory appeal and the other Defendant who has not been involved in
this matter has been delayed during the pendency of this appeal.

Respectfully submitted this 24th day of January, 2005.

Joane4*appas White
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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